The Concept of Law

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Description
My aim in this book has been to further the understanding of law, coercion, and morality as different but related social phenomena. Though it is primarily designed for the student of jurisprudence, I hope it may also be of use to those whose chief interests are in moral or political philosophy, or in sociology, rather than in law. The lawyer will regard the book as an essay in analytical jurisprudence, for it is concerned with the clarifica- tion of the general framework of legal thought, rather than with the criticism of law or legal policy. More over, at many points, I have raised questions which may well be said to be about the meanings of words. Thus I have considered: how 'being obliged' differs from 'having an obligation'; how the statement that a rule is a valid rule of law differs from a prediction of the behaviour of officials; what is meant by the assertion that a social group observes a rule and how this differs from and resembles the asser- tion that its members habitually do certain things. Indeed, one of the central themes of the book is that neither law nor any other form of social structure can be understood without an apprecia- tion of certain crucial distinctions between two different kinds of statement, which I have called 'internal' and 'external' and which can both be made whenever social rules are observed.
Notwithstanding its concern with analysis the book may also be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology; for the sugges- tion that inquiries into the meanings of words merely throw light on words is false. Many important distinctions, which are not immediately obvious, between types of social situation or relationships may best be brought to light by an examination of the standard uses of the relevant expressions and of the way in which these depend on a social context, itself often left unstated. In this field of study it is particularly true that we may use, as Professor J. L. Austin said, 'a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of the phenomena'.
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Table of Contents
I. PERSISTENT QUESTIONS
1. Perplexities of Legal Theory
2. Three Recurrent Issues
3. Definition
II. LAWS, COMMANDS, AND ORDERS
1. Varieties of Imperatives
2. Law as Coercive Orders
III. THE VARIETY OF LAWS
1. The Content of Laws
2. The Range of Application
3. Modes of Origin
IV. SOVEREIGN AND SUBJECT
1. The Habit of Obedience and the Continuity of Law
2. The Persistence of Law
3. Legal Limitations on Legislative Power
4. The Sovereign Behind the Legislature
V. LAW AS THE UNION OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RULES
1. Fresh Start
2. The Idea of Obligation
3. The Elements of Law
VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
1. Rule of Recognition and Legal Validity
2. New Questions
3. The Pathology of a Legal System
VII. FORMALISM AND RULE-SCEPTICISM
1. The Open Texture of Law
2. Varieties of Rule-Scepticism
3. Finality and Infallibility in Judicial Decision
4. Uncertainty in the Rule of Recognition
VIII. JUSTICE AND MORALITY
1. Principles of Justice
2. Moral and Legal Obligation
3. Moral Ideals and Social Criticism
IX. LAWS AND MORALS
1. Natural Law and Legal Positivism 20MAMM
2. The Minimum Content of Natural Law
3. Legal Validity and Moral Value
X. INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Sources of Doubt
2. Obligations and Sanctions
3. Obligation and the Sovereignty of States
4. International Law and Morality
5. Analogies of Form and Content
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Author Details
H.L.A. Hart